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I. INTRODUCTION
This Comment will examine the law governing disclosure of
medical information in various contexts, including criminal and
civil proceedings, state and federal actions, and other situations
in which disclosure may be demanded. This piece is intended to
be a practical guide for people and institutions in Louisiana, pro-
viding a fairly comprehensive view of the law. Because of the
importance of understanding the background of the medical
privilege, the Comment includes a brief historical synopsis.
Much of the law that determines whether medical informa-
tion may be revealed is related to the doctrine of privilege.
While Louisiana recognizes a broad medical privilege in civil
matters, the privilege is somewhat more limited in criminal mat-
ters. Health care providers cannot be compelled by a court or
other authority to disclose information gained in a protected
medical relationship, unless one of the numerous exceptions
169
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apply. This "medical privilege" is distinct from a "physician-
patient privilege"; the latter is generally much narrower and
usually does not encompass communications made to nurses and
similar personnel. The exceptions to both kinds of privilege are
significant, including mandatory reporting laws for child abuse
cases, as well as various statutory and jurisprudential reporting
requirements. However, unlike Louisiana law, federal law does
not recognize a broad medical privilege; in fact the Fifth Circuit
recognizes none at all. Nonetheless, federal statutes and regula-
tions do protect specific kinds of information.' -
In addition to the protective relational privilege, Louisiana
law also requires confidentiality in most settings. This law is
conceptually distinct from privilege, although in practice the dis-
tinction can become blurred. In theory, privilege serves as a
defensive weapon, enabling one to resist an attempt at compelled
disclosure. Conversely, the confidentiality requirement is an
offensive weapon, which allows a patient-plaintiff to sue the
health care provider for disclosing information that should have
been kept private. These laws are founded-on principles of medi-
cal ethics, as well as old common-law remedies such as breach of
confidence. To understand these and other aspects of this spe-
cialized privilege, a short overview of the development of the
medical privilege and confidentiality laws is-necessary.
II. HISTORY
The medical privilege has a long history in the civil law. Its
origins are the attorney-client privilege recognized in Roman
law, and the seal of the.confessional protected by medieval law.2
The relational privilege, called "professional secret" in the civil
law, re-emerged with the discovery of the Roman Digest and the
subsequent reception of much Roman doctrine on theConti-
nent.3  Domat wrote that the physician-patient professional
secret in French law originated with the incorporation of the
Hippocratic Oath in the Constitution of the Paris Medical
School in the eleventh or twelfth century.4 The Hippocratic
Oath, taken by physicians in ancient times and still administered
1. Aside from the question of privilege, some federal laws and regulations restrict
disclosures concerning people treated for drug and alcohol abuse.
* 2. D. SHUMAN & M. WEINER, THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE 49
(1987).
3. Id. at 58.
4. 1 J. DOMAT, Lus Loix CIVILES, LE DRorr PUBLIC, Livre 2, at 129, XIII (1777).
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at most medical schools, forbids disclosure of anything learned
in a professional relation; this vow is a positive mandate of confi-
dentiality.5 The oath, however, was not formally recognized
until 1670 and was only sporadically in effect in pre-Revolution-
ary France.6 But after the passage of article 378 of the French
Penal Code of 1810, French law continuously recognized the
professional secret for physicians.7
The common law, on the other hand, did not recognize a
medical privilege, nor is one recognized in England today.8 As
one commentator wryly put it, early modes of trial at common
law (such as trial by battle) "did not suggest the need for rela-
tional privileges."9 This bit of common-law history is significant
because the Federal Rules of Evidence are still governed by the
common law on questions of privilege.10 Many states, however,
did adopt the physician-patient privilege by statute." These
laws eventually led to the recognition in the United States of a
common-law tort of breach of confidence, which applies when
the confidence of a medical relationship is broken.
Louisiana's Constitution of 1879 recognized the medical
privilege, but the provision for it in the Constitution of 1921 was
ruled to be not self-operative; as a result, Louisiana courts
refused to recognize the privilege without additional legislative
action.12 To resolve this situation, the legislature promptly
passed legislation on medical privilege, establishing separate
statutes for civil and criminal medical privileges. The Louisiana
civil statute became one of the most comprehensive in the
country.
Not all agree that a medical privilege is beneficial to the
courts or even to society generally. The privilege has always
been controversial because it tends to obscure the truth. Many
commentators have argued that it is unnecessary. In fact, mod-
5. Eg., R. SLOVENKO & G. USDIN, PSYCHOTHERAPY, CONFIDENTIALITY, AND
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION 4 (1966).
6. D..SHUMAN & M. WEINER, supra note 2, at 59.
7. Id. at 60.
8. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2380 (J. McNaughton
rev. ed. 1961).
9. D. SHUMAN & M. WEINER, supra note 2, at 50.
10. FED. R. EVID. 501.
11. D. SHUMAN & M. WEINER, supra note 2, at 55.
12. LA. CONST. art. 6, § 12 (1921), construed in State v. Genna, 163 La. 701, 112 So.
655, cert. denied, 275 U.S. 522 (1927); Comment, The Physician-Patient Privilege in
Louisiana and Its Limitations, 31 TuL. L. REV. 192 (1956).
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ern legal scholars nearly universally disapprove of it. 3 Many,
however, think that such a privilege is appropriate for psycho-
therapy because of the special need to ensure confidentiality- 4
Yet the traditional justification for the physician-patient privi-
lege-that patients might not be honest with their doctors with-
out guarantees of confidentiality-is not supported by empirical
evidence, even in psychotherapy relationships. For example,
some patients do not even know that the privilege exists. 15
Moreover, even if the public does know about the privilege, it
may be useless in effect because of all of its exceptions. Com-
mentators, therefore, remain skeptical of the medical privilege.16
III. LouisIANA LAW
A. Medical Privilege in Criminal Matters
In 1928 the Louisiana Legislature passed article 476 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, creating a privilege in criminal
matters.1 7 Article 476 states in pertinent part:
No physician is permitted, whether during or after the termina-
tion of his employment as such, unless with his patient's
express consent, to disclose any communication made to him as
such physician by or on behalf of his patient, or the result of
any investigation made into the patient's physical or mental
condition, or any opinion based upon such investigation, or any
information that he may have gotten by reason of his being
such physician .... 18
The statute does not apply when a physician is appointed by the
court to conduct an examination, provided that the doctor was
not selected by the patient.'9 Presumably, lawmakers wanted
13. E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 98 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter
MCCORMICK].
Obsolete law review commentary on the subject includes Note, Physician-Patient
Privilege, 27 LA. L. REv. 361 (1967); Note, Evidence-Privileged Communication-
Physician-Patient Privilege-Louisiana Civil Procedure, 12 Loy. L. REv. 142 (1965-1966).
14. State v. Aucoin, 362 So. 2d 503, 505 (La. 1978); D. SHUMAN & M. WEINER,
supra note 2, at 3 passim; R. SLOVENKO & G. USDIN, supra note 5, at 4 passim.
15. D. SHUMAN & M. WEINER, supra note 2, at 77-134 (including empirical studies
on psychotherapy).
16. See MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 105 & n.1 (collecting commentary); 8 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2380.
17. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:476 (West 1981).
18. Id. The statute also provides that a physician may be cross-examined about any
certificate issued by him. Id.
19. Id.; see also State v. Felde, 422 So. 2d 370, 381-82 (La. 1982), cert denied, 461
U.S. 918 (1983).
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the courts to have some means to obtain reliable information
about the medical condition of criminal defendants without dis-
couraging people from seeking medical attention. When a court
orders an examination, the patient has not sought medical help;
thus no physician-patient relationship, at least in the legal sense,
exists. According to article 476, therefore, someone who needs
medical assistance can seek it and be honest in the relationship
without fear of disclosure. The court, however, still has the abil-
ity to get the information it needs by ordering a separate exami-
nation by another doctor.2'
Under article 476, certain general requirements must be
met before the medical privilege applies. Internally, the statute
refers only to physicians and not to health care providers in gen-
eral.21 The law might conceivably be applied to others if they
were deemed to be acting as the physician's agent or assistant.22
In State v. Lassai, however, the director of a state drug-treat-
ment center was denied the privilege, even though she was the
functional equivalent of a physician or social worker.23 The cru-
cial question was whether the director was in fact a physician or
other professional under the statute, not whether she was the
equivalent of one.24 Ultimately, article 476 only applies to infor-
mation that a doctor received "by reason of his being such
physician. "25
A second requirement that must be met for article 476 to
apply is that the patient must "voluntarily consult the physician
for treatment or diagnosis."' 26 Thus, in State v. Berry, the court
20. Theoretically, the patient might refuse to tell the court-appointed physician
anything.
21. Contrast article 476 with the later civil statute, LA. Rlv. STAT. ANN. § 13:3734
(West Supp. 1990), discussed infra notes 92-107.
22. MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 101 & n.6, § 313 & n.25.
23. There are other privileges for licensed mental health counselors and board-
certified social workers. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37:1114 (same privilege as attorneys),
§ 37:2714 (West 1988).
For the attorney-client privilege, see LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:3734.3 (West Supp.
1990) ("No attorney... shall give evidence of anything that has been confided to him by
his client, without the consent of the client."). The body of case law on the attorney-client
privilege is enormous and is outside the scope of this Comment. The privileges for both
social workers and mental health counselors are relatively new (established in 1972 and
1987, respectively) and have not been fully developed by case law.
24. State v. Lassai, 366 So. 2d 1389, 1390-91 (La. 1978).
25. See State v. Lyons, 113 La. 959, 37 So. 890 (1904), holding that the doctor must
have gained the knowledge in his professional capacity if the privilege is to attach. This
case should still be good law.
26. State v. Walker, 376 So. 2d 92, 93 (La. 1979); see also State v. Brogdon, 457 So.
2d 616, 627 (La. 1984); State v. Carter, 383 So. 2d 357, 359 (La. 1980); State v. Berry, 324
1990] 173
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held that the defendant's examination by the coroner after his
arrest was not subject to the privilege.27 In State v. Walker, on
the other hand, the defendant had voluntarily consulted a prison
doctor for diagnosis and treatment three days after his arrival in
prison, so the privilege did attach.28 When read together,
Walker and Berry show that the person who claims the privilege
must have voluntarily consulted the physician for diagnosis or
treatment, and whether that person was in custody at the time is
irrelevant. This principle is supported by State v. Carter.29
Further, article 476 only applies when the patient's commu-
nication is made in confidence.3 0 This requirement is not to be
too strictly interpreted in Louisiana, however. For example, in
Carter, the attending physician (in the frenetic emergency room
of Charity Hospital in New Orleans) asked the defendant how
he had received his gunshot wounds, and the defendant candidly
replied that he had been trying to rob a lady but she shot him.
The state argued that since this statement was made in a busy
corridor in the presence of two police officers; it was not privi-
leged. The court rejected the argument, noting that the officers
were standing far enough away that they did not hear the
exchange.3
The liberal view of confidentiality espoused in Carter (and
supported by the broad language of R.S. 15:476) can be distin-
guished from the four Wigmore principles quoted in State v.
Aucoin .32 Wigmore, who was not well disposed towards privi-
leges in general and who particularly disparaged the physician-
patient privilege, wrote that there should be no privilege unless
So. 2d 822, 828 (La. 1975); MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 99. See generally 8 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2381.
Louisiana adopted the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, which contained a provision
explicitly suspending any medical privilege when a patient was illegally attempting to
obtain drugs. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:978 (West 1977 & Supp. 1990). This provision
was probably unnecessary because of the requirement that the "patient" be seeking
treatment, and the provision was repealed when the Uniform Controlled Substances Act
replaced the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. Act No. 634, 1972 La. Acts 1406.
27. Berry, 324 So. 2d at 828 (relying on principles espoused by Wigmore &
McCormick).
28. Walker, 376 So. 2d at 93. The dissent, however, did not believe that the
relationship was in fact an "employment" within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 94
(Marcus, J., dissenting).
29. Carter, 383 So. 2d at 359.
30. IL; Berry, 324 So. 2d at 829 (regarding the clergy-penitent privilege).
31. Carter, 383 So. 2d at 359.
32. State v. Aucoin, 362 So. 2d 503, 505 (La. 1978); Pugh & McClelland,
Developments in the Law, 1979-1980-Evidence, 41 LA. L. Rnv. 595 (1981).
[Vol. 65
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the following conditions were met: first, the person must have
made the communication in confidence; second, confidentiality
must be essential to the relationship; third, society must wish to
foster such relationships; and fourth, the injury to the relation-
ship that would result from disclosure must be greater than the
benefit to the factfinder resulting from disclosure.33 Wigmore
opined that only the third factor holds true for the physician-
patient privilege. While some may disagree with Wigmore, their
position is tenuous, given the results of empirical studies.3 4 Lou-
isiana courts have not insisted that all four factors be fulfilled,
and although there is general agreement that privileges should
be strictly construed,35 the courts are not always so stringent.
For instance, many laws (including R.S. 13:3734, Louisiana's
civil medical privilege) require that privileged communications
be necessary to the treatment of the patient. 36 Carter's state-
ment, however, was probably unnecessary to treatment but was
held privileged anyway.
Under article 476, the right to exclude privileged testimony
is personal and can only be invoked by the person in whose favor
the privilege lies. Thus, if the patient is not a party to the
action or cannot protect his own rights, the patient "should be
given an opportunity to claim the privilege before the examina-
tion is proceeded with,"' 38 unless the privilege was already aban-
doned. However, until the patient decides whether to exercise
the option, most authorities would allow the judge or the physi-
cian to invoke the privilege.3 9 If they have the opportunity, doc-
33. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2285, quoted in Aucoin, 362 So. 2d at 505.
34. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
35. State v. Lassai, 366 So. 2d 1389, 1390-91 (La. 1978).
36. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 100.
37. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:476 (West 1981). The commentators would apply
this principle to both civil and criminal cases. E.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 102.
38. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2386.
39. See iL § 2386 & n.0; see also MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 105(e) (1942);
UNiF. R. EVID. 503 (1974) (although having any physician's privilege at all is optional in
the Uniform Rules); MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 102 (citing authority that would allow
the judge to enforce the privilege); Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications,
98 HARV. L. REv. 1450, 1536 & n. 31-32 (1985); Comment, supra note 12, at 193.
A number of authorities address the propriety of a doctor's assertion of the privilege
on behalf of a patient who cannot assert it for himself. E.g., In re Search Warrant (Sealed),
810 F.2d 67 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987); People v. Bickham, 89 Ill. 2d 1,
431 N.E.2d 365 (1982); Osterman v. Ehrenworth, 106 N.J. Super. 515, 256 A.2d 123
(1969); Cynthia B. v. New Rochelle Hosp. Medical Center, 60 N.Y.2d 452, 458 N.E.2d
363, 470 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1983); Commonwealth v. Romanowicz, 213 Pa. Super. 382, 248
A.2d 238 (1968); Annotation, Physician-Patient Privilege as Extending to Patient's Medical
or Hospital Records, 10 A.L.R.4th 552 (1981); Annotation, Discovery, in Medical
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tors should enforce the privilege and resist divulging protected
information because of their ethical obligations.
1. The Child Abuse Exception
Section 403 of the Louisiana Criminal Code expressly pro-
vides for an exception to the medical privilege when child abuse
is involved. 40 Section 403 may be invoked by "any individual
who provides health care services." 41 If that individual "has
cause to believe that a child's physical or mental health or wel-
fare is endangered as a result of abuse or neglect .. or that
abuse.., was a contributing factor in a child's death," 42 and the
child's caretaker is believed to be involved in the abuse, then that
individual must report to the local child protection unit of the
Department of Social Services. If the caretaker is not involved,
then the local law enforcement agency must be alerted.43 The
statute sets forth in detail the information to be included in the
report.44 The report may name those "thought to have caused
or contributed to the child's condition. '45 The first report may
be oral, but a written one must be given within five days.46 The
statute also immunizes from civil or criminal liability those who
Malpractice Action, of Names of Other Patients to Whom Defendant Has Given Treatment
Similar to That Allegedly Injuring Plaintiff, 74 A.L.R.3d 1055 (1976); see also Singleton v.
Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 108 (1976) (physicians may assert the federal constitutional privacy
rights of their patients); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965) (same).
Compare PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 503 (1972) (attorney to assert the client's privilege).
40. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(F) (West Supp. 1990).
41. Id. § 14:403(B)(4)(a).
42. Id § 14:403(C).
43. Id § 14:403(D). A caretaker includes the child's parent, guardian, foster parent,
"an employee of a public or private residential facility, or other person providing residential
care." Id § 14:403(B)(2).
44. Id § 14:403(D)(2). The report must contain, if known:
(a) The name, address, age, sex, and race of the child.
(b) The nature, extent, and cause of the child's injuries or endangered condition,
including any previous known or suspected abuse to this child or the child's
siblings.
(c) The name and address of the child's parent or other caretaker.
(d) The child's family composition.
(e) The name and address of the reporter.
(f) An account of how this child came to the reporter's attention.
(g) Any explanation of the cause of the child's injury or condition offered by the
child, the caretaker, or any other person.
(h) Any other information which the reporter believes might be important or
relevant.
Id
45. Id § 14:403(D)(3).
46. Id § 14:403(D)(4).
[Vol. 65
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report, cooperate, and testify in good faith.4 7 A mandatory
reporter who willfully fails to report is guilty of a misdemeanor
punishable by fines and incarceration. 8
The abrogation of privilege by section 403 is complete: no
evidence whatsoever may be excluded on grounds of medical
privilege in "any proceeding concerning the abuse or neglect...
of a child." 49 The section waives not only the victim's privilege,
but also any privilege the perpetrator may have had. In State v.
Bellard, the defendant's doctor found not only that the defend-
ant had gonorrhea, but also that a five-year-old child living with
the defendant had also contracted the disease.5 0 The court held
that section 403 abrogated the defendant's privilege.51 Recently,
the legislature has made this rule even clearer.5 2
Section 403.2 of title 14 provides similarly for the abuse and
neglect of adults who cannot act for themselves. The statute
does not single out health care providers as specific mandatory
reporters, but instead requires "[a]ny person having cause to
believe that an adult's physical or mental health or welfare has
been or may be further adversely affected by abuse or neglect by
others or self-neglect"5 3 to report to any adult-protection or law
enforcement agency.54 In addition, there are criminal penalties
for those who knowingly and willfully fail to report,5 5 and
immunity is provided for all those who report in good faith,
except for the perpetrator.5 6 Although privileges are not explic-
itly addressed, the immunity provision nullifies any penalties for
violating a professional confidence, so reporting is the advisable
course. The report should be made orally, immediately after
learning of the abuse or neglect.57 A written confirmation would
47. Id. § 14:403(E); Gross v. Haight, 496 So. 2d 1225 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1986).
48. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(I) (all health care providers are mandatory
reporters under this statute).
49. Id § 14:403(F).
50. 533 So. 2d 961 (La. 1988).
51. Id at 964-66 (alternate holding).
52. A 1988 amendment to subsection F of the statute strengthened the rule: under
the former subsection F, the defendant's being deemed a caretaker was significant. See id
at 964. This factor is now immaterial.
53. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:403.2(C) (West 1986 & Supp. 1990) (emphasis
added).
54. Id § 14:403.2(D)(1).
55. Id § 14:403.2(J)(1).
56. Id § 14:403.2(K).
57. Id § 14:403.2(D)(4).
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be prudent, particularly because of the criminal penalties that
result from a failure to report abuse or neglect.
2. The Hospital Records Controversy
The importance of the medical privilege is demonstrated in
the rape case of State v. Walker. As in Bellard, the defendant
and the rape victim were found to have gonorrhea. The disease
was discovered in the victim shortly after the rape; the defendant
sought treatment on his own initiative at a parish prison. The
prison doctor testified, over objection, about the defendant's con-
dition, and Walker was convicted by a jury of aggravated rape.
Admissibilty of the doctor's testimony was the issue on appeal.
Since the victim was not a child, R.S. 14:403, which abro-
gates all privileges, did not apply. Because the defendant sought
medical attention on his own, the knowledge of the prison doc-
tor was privileged. The state advanced two arguments that the
privilege did not apply, one of which was that the doctor's testi-
mony was admissible because hospital records are always admis-
sible. This argument is completely untenable in all states other
than Louisiana.5 9 In Louisiana, however, there is some question
regarding this issue.
By statute, "Whenever a certified copy of the chart or rec-
ord of any hospital ... is offered in evidence in any court of
competent jurisdiction, it shall be received in evidence by such
court as prima facie proof of its contents."'  In State v. O'Brien,
the court held that this statute was a special law, which abro-
gated the privilege granted by the general physician's privilege
statute.61 This decision contradicted the existing commentary
and was sharply criticized when handed down: the doctor
should not be able to waive the privilege simply by recording the
information.62 Courts also criticized the O'Brien decision.
Unsurprisingly, the court in State v. Walker, explicitly
58. 376 So. 2d 92 (La. 1979).
59. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 313; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8,
§ 2382(3) (Wigmore, however, might accept the argument as applied to public hospitals
because then the records would be public records as well as medical records.).
60. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:3714 (West Supp. 1990).
61. 255 La. 704, 718, 232 So. 2d 484, 489 (1970) (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:3714).
62. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 313; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8,
§ 2382(3); Pugh, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term-
Evidence, 31 LA. L. REv. 381, 383 (1971); Comment, The Doctor-Patient Privilege in Civil
Cases in Louisiana, 20 LA. L. REv. 418 (1960).
[Vol. 65
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rejected the reasoning of O'Brien as "unsound. ' 63 The justices
observed that section 3714 was merely an exception to the hear-
say rule and should not affect the medical privilege.64 Unfortu-
nately, instead of overruling O'Brien, the Walker court only
distinguished it: in O'Brien actual records were introduced, but
in Walker there was only testimony. Nevertheless, the Walker
decision was enthusiastically received.65 The supreme court in
State v. Carter, using the same approach, again distinguished
O'Brien.6 But in State v. Berluchaux, a lower court, ruling on
the admissibility of actual records, applied the faulty O'Brien
reasoning because the case had never been explicitly overruled. 67
Unquestionably, Berluchaux will be criticized on the same
grounds as O'Brien. A more consistent ruling would have been
that O'Brien was limited to its specific facts and was no longer
good law after Walker and Carter. Ultimately, if courts con-
tinue to follow the O'Brien rationale, there will be an inappropri-
ate loophole in the medical privilege. Thus, if a physician is
asked at trial to disclose documents that have been recorded by a
hospital, he should contend that the information is privileged. If
the trial court rules adversely, and irreparable injury results
from the disclosure, the defendant would have the right to an
interlocutory petition for a writ of certiorari. 68 Absent irrepara-
ble injury, defendant should appeal the conviction and sentence
with a bill of exceptions, assigning the privilege ruling as error.69
3. Implied Consent
By statute, anyone who drives on public highways is
deemed to have consented to body-fluid tests for alcohol and cer-
tain drugs.70 Tests taken pursuant to the procedures in those
laws and regulations set up certain presumptions and are gener-
ally admissible.71 Since the driver is deemed by these special
63. State v. Walker, 376 So. 2d 92, 94 n.5 (La. 1979).
64. IMJ
65. Pugh & McClelland, Developments in the Law, 1979-1980-Evidence, 41 LA. L.
REv. 595, 610-11 (1981).
66. 383 So. 2d 357 (La. 1980).
67. 522 So. 2d 600 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 531 So. 2d 467 (La. 1988).
68. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 912 comment (c) (West 1984); see State v.
Doucet, 199 La. 276, 5 So. 2d 894 (1942); State v. Moore, 140 La. 281, 72 So. 965 (1916).
69. In federal court, defendant may move for certification of the question for
interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988), if necessary. Eventually the
Louisiana Supreme Court should clarify the law in this regard.
70. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:661 (West Supp. 1990).
71. Id §§ 32:661-:664.
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statutes to have consented to the test and to the use of the test
results in a criminal trial, the medical privilege does not apply.
In Berluchaux,72 the procedures prescribed by the legisla-
ture in the statute were not followed. The defendant was seri-
ously injured in a car accident and the blood alcohol test was
ordered by the attending physician in the course of pre-operative
preparation. Berluchaux had personally sought medical help
and was not accompanied by law enforcement officers. 3 Since
the test was not administered in compliance with the implied
consent law, the state was not entitled to the results of the test;
consequently, the state issued a subpoena duces tecum for the
defendant's hospital records. Only at that point did the question
of privilege arise. 74 Thus, unlike Berluchaux, if the procedures
set forth in sections 661 to 664 of title 32 are followed, privilege
and the use of hospital records in judicial proceedings is not an
issue. The hospitals and those who administer the tests are
exempted from civil and criminal liability for administration of
the tests.75
Although there is no per se abrogation of the physician-
patient privilege in the statute, it seems that the patient, by driv-
ing on a public highway, has consented as a matter of law to
certain tests under specified conditions, and has additionally
consented to the use of the results in a criminal trial. In fact, the
statute requires that the arrested person be apprised by the
arresting officer that the results of the test can be used against
him in a legal proceeding.76 Generally, the defendant is allowed
to withdraw his consent." Absent withdrawal, because the
patient consents to the use of the information, the medical privi-
lege does not apply. Similarly, the doctor or other medical per-
sonnel do not violate any medical ethical rule by cooperating in
the disclosure to law enforcement agencies, since the disclosure
72. State v. Berluchaux, 552 So. 2d 600 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 531 So.
2d 467 (La. 1988).
73. a at 601.
74. Other than Berluchaux, no cases have been found in which the defendant tried to
invoke the privilege in this context. The best defense argument would be that R.S. 32:661
implies consent, while R.S. 15:476 requires "express consent" before the privilege is
waived. As noted in the next section in the text of the Comment, the supreme court wrote
its way around this argument in an insanity-defense case, State v. Aucoin, 362 So. 2d 503,
506 (La. 1978), and would probably do the same in the drunk-driving context.
75. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:664(C).
76. d § 32:661(C).
77. Ia § 32:666(A) (but the arrested person is not allowed to refuse the test when
someone in the accident has died or sustained serious bodily injury).
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was made with the test subject's legal consent, and because phy-
sicians are required by law to make the disclosure.
4. The Insanity Defense Exception
The Louisiana Supreme Court has consistently held that
when a defendant puts his sanity at issue, he has impliedly
waived any physician-patient privilege he may have had relative
to that narrow issue, unless prejudicial effect on the merits out-
weighs the probative value of the evidence.7 In this context, a
physician can be required to testify, even if he is not a court-
appointed physician. The supreme court's approach to the
insanity defense exception, however, has been criticized because
R.S. 15:476 requires an express waiver of the privilege.7 9 Recog-
nizing the conflict, Judge Tate in State v. Aucoin, wrote around
it by saying that the insanity defense was not an implied waiver,
but rather "an implied restriction on the use of the privilege." 80
Under Judge Tate's rationale, the statute does not apply when-
ever the defendant puts his sanity at issue, regardless of implied
or express consent. The insanity defense exception, therefore,
remains good law.
5. Other Exceptions
In addition to the other mandatory-reporting exceptions,
one statute requires disclosure of certain burn injuries. They
must be reported under defined circumstances.8 1 The report
must be made orally to the state fire marshal's office immediately
after examination or treatment.82 There is no mention of the
78. State v. Berry, 324 So. 2d 822, 827-28 (La. 1975) (relying on 8 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 8, §§ 2388-2390 for authority), cerL denied, 425 U.S. 954 (1976); see State v.
Brogdon, 457 So. 2d 616, 628 (La. 1984), cerL denied, 471 U.S. 1111 (1985); Aucoin, 362
So. 2d at 505.
79. Pugh & McClelland, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-
1979 Terra-Evidence, 40 LA. L. REv. 779, 794-95 (1980).
80. Aucoin, 362 So. 2d at 506.
81. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:403.4(B) (West Supp. 1990). The report must be
given when
there is reason to believe that arson is involved and the victim sustains second or
third degree burns to five percent or more of the body or any burns to the upper
respiratory tract or laryngeal edema due to the inhalation of super-heated air, and
every case of a burn injury or wound which is likely to or may result in death.
Id
82. Id § 14:403.4(C)(1). The report should contain, if known, the victim's name,
address and birth date; the address where the injury occurred; the date and time of injuries;
their degree and severity; the percent and areas of the body burned; the apparent cause; the
name and address of the reporting facility; and the physician's name. Id § 14:403.4(C)(2).
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physician-patient privilege, but since immunity is provided,
cooperation with the law is the advisable course.
Additionally, physicians and hospital managers or superin-
tendents are required to report every case of venereal disease,
omitting the name and address of the patient.8 3 Venereal dis-
eases, in the eyes of the statute, are syphilis, gonorrhea, and
chancroid.84 If the patient refuses to submit to treatment for ten
days, or if he exposes anyone else, the attending physician must
report the patient's name and address. 85 This statute could be
important in a number of court contexts because it often is rele-
vant in rape and child molestation cases.86
Psychologists and psychiatrists are subject to another
reporting requirement, but it is different from the others. These
professionals have a positive duty to warn or take reasonable
precautions "[w]hen a patient has communicated an immediate
threat of physical violence against a clearly identified victim or
victims, coupled with the apparent intent and ability to carry out
that threat. ' 87 In that situation, the treating psychologist or
psychiatrist, while "exercising reasonable professional judgment,
shall not be liable for a breach of confidentiality for warning of
such threat or taking precautions to provide protection. ' '8 8 This
reporting requirement is different because it may be discharged
by warning the victim as well as notifying law enforcement
authorities near the victim or patient's residence.8 9
There is one final caveat: In forming their opinions, expert
medical witnesses rely on certain types of evidence, including
medical records. The experts may be cross-examined about
these sources, and may refer specifically to them while testify-
ing.9° Accordingly, information on which experts base their
The fire marshal has authority to make rules to carry out the section, and all reporters in
good faith are given immunity. Id. § 14:403.4(D)(2), (E).
83. Id § 40:1065(A) (West Supp. 1990).
84. Id § 40:1061. See also infra notes 127-29 and accompanying text (discussing the
AIDS statute).
85. Id § 40:1065(B).
86. E.g., State v. Bellard, 533 So. 2d 961, 963 n.2 (La. 1988); State v. Walker, 376 So.
2d 92 (La. 1979).
87. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.2(A) (West Supp. 1990). See generally Tarasoff
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (the
seminal case in this area).
88. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.2(A).
89. Id. § 9:2800.2(C).
90. State v. Fallon, 290 So. 2d 273 (La. 1974); State v. Brogdon, 457 So. 2d 616, 628
(La. 1984).
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opinions should no longer be considered privileged; there is no
physician-patient relationship with the expert because the
patient has not sought out the doctor for treatment or similar
services.
B. Medical Privilege in Civil Matters91
There was no medical privilege in Louisiana civil matters
until the passage of R.S. 13:3734 in 1968. Now, section 3734 is
one of the most comprehensive privilege statutes:
Except as hereinafter provided, in civil cases, proceedings
before a medical review panel and in medical and dental arbi-
tration proceedings, and in proceedings and investigation pre-
liminary to all such actions, a patient or his authorized
representative, has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to pre-
vent a health care provider from disclosing any communica-
tion, wherever made, relating to any fact, statement or opinion
which was necessary to enable that health care provider or any
other health care provider to diagnose, treat, prescribe or act
for the patient.92
According to the statute, "'Communication' means the acquir-
ing, recording or transmittal of any information, in any manner
whatsoever, concerning any facts, opinions or statements neces-
sary to enable the health care provider to diagnose, treat, pre-
scribe or to act for the patients."93 "Health care provider"
includes hospitals, physicians, pharmacists, physical therapists,
psychologists, licensed professional counselors, and officers,
employees, or agents of any of them, and others.94 There is no
91. The Section above on the medical privilege in criminal matters discusses privilege
statutes that also apply in civil matters, /.a, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §9:2800.2
(psychotherapist's duty to warn); id. § 37:1114 (West 1988) (licensed social worker's
privilege); id. § 37:2714 (West 1988) (licensed mental health counselors enjoy the same
privilege as attorneys).
92. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3734(B) (West Supp. 1990) (citations omitted). See
generally Comment, Competent Opinions and Privileges, 21 Loy. L. REv. 422, 445-46
(1975).
The following cases held that R.S. 15:476 does not create a physician-patient privilege
in civil matters and are now largely irrelevant: Moosa v. Abdalla, 248 La. 344, 178 So. 2d
273 (1965); Boulware v. Boulware, 153 So. 2d 182 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1963); Morgan v.
American Bitumuls Co., 39 So. 2d 139 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1949), aff'd, 217 La. 968, 47
So. 2d 739 (1950); Shepard v. Whitney Nat'l Bank, 177 So. 825 (La. Ct. App. Orleans
1938); State v. McCoy, 109 La. 682, 33 So. 730 (1903). The change in the statutory and
case law is discussed in Pugh & McClelland, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981-
Evidence, 42 LA. L. REv. 659, 667 (1982).
93. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:3734(A)(5).
94. Id § 13:3734(A)(1), (3).
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privilege in contests of wills, and an administrator, spouse, or
child's representative is deemed to consent to disclosure when
seeking damages for the patient's death.9" Otherwise, there is
general agreement that the privilege may be claimed by a proper
representative after the death of a patient.96
The privilege does not attach when "any person brings an
action to recover damages, in tort or for worker's compensation
under federal or state laws, for personal injuries. ' 9 7 Yet, when
the patient is the defendant in the action instead of the plaintiff,
the privilege applies. 98 The statutory waiver of privilege applies
to both discovery and testimony at trial99 but to nothing else.100
In Dennis v. Claiborne,101 however, the court held that a physi-
cian who disclosed patient information to the defendant-physi-
cian in a malpractice suit was not liable because the information
would be discoverable; therefore, the informal disclosure by let-
ter did no harm. Thus, Dennis applies to disclosures that are at
least incidental to a lawsuit. Health care providers would be
more prudent, though, to refuse disclosure unless they are
required to disclose by valid legal process.
What information is protected by the privilege is a more
difficult issue. According to Williams v. Sistrunk, only informa-
tion that was necessary to treatment and relevant to the claim or
defense may be disclosed.10 2 This limitation on what may be dis-
closed is not addressed in the statute. The statute provides only
that when the privilege is waived, "any health care provider who
has attended such person at any time may disclose any commu-
nication which was necessary to enable him to diagnose, treat,
prescribe, or act for said patient."103 The judicial gloss on the
statute seems appropriate, however.
Medical records in worker's compensation cases are gov-
erned by a specific section: "a health care provider who has at
95. Iai § 13:3734(C)(1), (2), (4).
96. See UNIF. R. EVID. 503, 13A U.L.A. 277 (1974); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8,
§ 2387; Comment, supra note 13, at 193-94; cf. Rhodes v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 172
F.2d 183 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 930 (1949).
97. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:3734(C)(3).
98. Vincent v. Lemaire, 370 So. 2d 190, 194 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
99. LA. RyV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3734(D).
100. Williams v. Sistrunk, 417 So. 2d 14, 16 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1982). When
disclosure is made outside of trial or discovery, the doctor may be held liable in tort for
violation of the privilege. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
101. 441 So. 2d 387 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
102. Williams, 417 So. 2d at 15.
103. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3734(C)(3).
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any time treated the employee shall release any requested medi-
cal information and records relative to the employee's injury, to
the employee, employer, or its worker's compensation insurer,
or the agent or representative" of any of them. 104 Information
about other treatments or conditions becomes available only on
presentation of a subpoena or by written consent of the
worker.10 5 The information must be kept confidential, and those
who obtain it are liable for breach of confidence. Use of the
information before a court, the Office of Worker's Compensation
Administration, or the Louisiana Worker's Compensation Sec-
ond Injury Board is not a breach of confidence.10 6
Outside of the worker's compensation context, the patient's
written authorization will still allow the provider to disclose
stipulated information. 10 7  (Of course such an authorization
allows disclosure in a worker's compensation context as well,
but it is not required.) Upon paying reasonable costs, patients
must be allowed access to and copies of their records unless
there is good cause to deny the patient the information. The
provider may rely on the reasonable representations of the per-
son making the request.10 8
A waiver of the medical privilege may be inferred, in some
cases, from certain actions of the patient. The commentators
treat the subject of waiver in great detail, and most would
impose numerous restrictions on the use of the privilege when
the patient takes certain actions. 10 9 Louisiana decisions do not
infer a waiver as often as the commentators would, but the
courts have held that the legislature, by making "[t]he mental
and physical health of the parties"' 10 one of the factors in decid-
ing child custody, created another exception to the privilege."'
104. Id. § 23:1127(A) (West Supp. 1990).
105. Id Releases of records under this statute must be in writing, with a copy sent
free to the employee.
106. Id § 23:1127(B).
107. Id § 13:3734(E) (West Supp. 1990).
108. Id § 40:2144(3)-(D) (West Supp. 1990).
109. See MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 103 passim; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8,
§ 2390 passim.
110. Carney v. Carney, 525 So. 2d 357, 358 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 530
So. 2d 88 (La. 1988).
111. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 146(C)(2)(g) (West Supp. 1990); Gras v. Gras, 489 So.
2d 1283, 1288 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 493 So. 2d 1222 (La. 1986); Dawes v.
Dawes, 454 So. 2d 311, 312 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 457 So. 2d 18 (La. 1984).
Wing v. Wing, 393 So. 2d 285 (La. Ct. App. Ist Cir. 1980), was decided before revised
article 146 was passed, and held that the privilege did apply in a child custody proceeding.
It is no longer good law.
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The court in Dawes v. Dawes alternatively held that because a
plaintiff-father made his physical condition an "essential ele-
ment" of his suit, he impliedly waived his medical privilege."'2
The essential-element criterion was taken from Arsenaux v.
Arsenaux,1 3 a controversial and important case concerning the
medical privilege.1 1 4 The supreme court held that in a suit for
separation and divorce, the medical privilege is not abrogated,
because such a suit is not enumerated among the exceptions to
section 3734. In Arsenaux, the husband proffered his wife's
medical record, which tended to prove that she was adulterous.
In an oft-quoted passage, the court stated: "Since the legislature
has delineated the civil suits which waive the privilege, an addi-
tional judicial exception would contravene the statute and flout
the law. Because Ms. Arsenaux's physical condition is not an
essential element of her suit, no implied waiver of the privilege
should be inferred." '
Everyone who has written on the subject, other than the
majority, believes that the wife, by suing for alimony and alleg-
ing freedom from fault, did make her physical condition an
essential element in her case.11 6 Following the decision, there
were many calls on the legislature to modify the privilege, but no
action has been taken. In accord with the principle in Arsenaux,
courts have since held that the privilege is abrogated only in
suits enumerated in section 3734. These courts have confronted
persuasive arguments that the privilege should be abrogated in
interdiction and paternity proceedings, but they have not
departed from the statute.1 17 Arsenaux remains good law.
Essentially the same confidentiality and privilege laws apply
to a health maintenance organization (HMO): "Any data or
information pertaining to the diagnosis, treatment, or health of
112. Dawes, 454 So. 2d at 313.
113. 428 So. 2d 427 (La. 1983).
114. See Pugh & McClelland, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983-Evidence, 44
LA. L. REV. 335 (1983).
115. Arsenaux, 428 So. 2d at 430 (citation omitted).
116. See Pugh & McClelland, supra note 114; Note, The Louisiana Supreme Court
and the Physician-Patient Privilege: Arsenaux v. Arsenaux, 44 LA. L. REv. 1813, 1819 n.35
(1984).
117. See Interdiction of Haggerty, 485 So. 2d 67 (La. C. App. 4th Cir. 1985); Heable
v. Heable, 248 So. 2d 847 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.) (en banc) (claim to disavow paternity), writ
denied, 252 So. 2d 456 (La. 1971). The child custody cases are arguably consistent with
these cases if one accepts the court's reasoning that the legislature itself abrogated the
privilege in child custody suits by amending article 146. See supra notes 110-12 and
accompanying text.
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any enrollee or potential enrollee obtained from such persons or
from any provider by any [HMO] shall be held in confidence and
shall not be disclosed to any person," except as required by other
law, upon express consent of the patient, or in litigation between
the patient and the HMO.' 8 The HMO is entitled to invoke the
same privileges as other health care providers. 1 9
Whether the privelege involves an HMO or other health
care provider, there is a loophole in the privilege that should not
be overlooked: Disclosures made to insurers are not privi-
leged. 120 This exception is very important. In the words of the
Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, "Health care insur-
ers are not required under any statutory provision to protect
confidential communications. They are immunized from liabil-
ity if they dissiminate [sic] an insured's medical information." 2 '
An insurer, if called to testify, must make the required
disclosures.
Health care providers themselves, however, have a duty of a
much different nature. If a provider makes an unauthorized dis-
closure-that is, if information is disclosed in the absence of
either the patient's written authorization, a subpoena, or a court
order-the provider is subject to tort liability under several theo-
ries, such as violation of privilege, breach of confidence, invasion
of privacy, and defamation. 122 If the medical information is not
privileged (i.e., if one of the exceptions applies) then under state
law the provider should respond to discovery. If the information
might be privileged, a doctor, hospital, or health organization
118. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:2020(A) (West Supp. 1990).
119. Id. § 22:2020(B).
120. Lemann v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 523 So. 2d 948, 951 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
1988).
121. Id.
122. See Gross v. Haight, 496 So. 2d 1225 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff loses
defamation claim because providers shielded by child-abuse-reporting immunity); Williams
v. Sistrunk, 417 So. 2d 14, 15 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1982) (plaintiffs may state cause of
action for violation of privilege); Acosta v. Cary, 365 So. 2d 4 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1978)
(there is a privacy right in general, but not in this case because the doctor did not actually
treat plaintiff); Glenn v. Kerlin, 248 So. 2d 834 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1971) (instituting suit
where physical condition is relevant waives invasion of privacy claim); Pennison v.
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 154 So. 2d 617, 618-19 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.) (same),
writ denied, 156 So. 2d 226 (La. 1963); see also LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.2 (West
Supp. 1990) (shielding psychiatrists and psychologists from breach of confidence and
invasion of privacy suits under some circumstances). See generally Annotation, Physician's
Tort Liability for Unauthorized Disclosure of Confidential Information About Patient, 48
A.L.R.4th 668 (1986). Under federal law, conversely, drug- and alcohol-abuse records may
be protected even without an applicable state privilege. These laws and regulations are
discussed below.
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should find out positively, or else risk tort liability. The type of
suit may determine whether the privilege applies. The prudent
health care provider should assert the privilege in all cases
except those in which the privilege positively does not apply. In
this way, the provider should be protected from tort liability.
When served with a subpoena duces tecum for trial, as
opposed to discovery, the records custodian of the hospital or
clinic should deliver a copy of the requested records. They
should be enclosed in a sealed inner envelope, and precautions
should be taken to ensure that the records will only be unsealed
at the direction of the court. The statute describes the particular
procedures to be followed. 23
Aside from the privilege laws, there are specific provisions
governing the disclosure of medical information in certain cir-
cumstances. When a patient has successfully sued for medical
malpractice and has become eligible for future medical care, his
compensation fund must select a physician who will be present
at subsequent physical examinations and who may be required
to testify about them. In these situations, the privilege is abro-
gated.124 Minors may undergo abortions with a court order if
the parents are not consulted or do not consent; procedures for
obtaining such an order are set by statute.1 25 There is absolute
liability for disclosing "the making or acceptance" of an anatom-
ical gift without the consent of the donor, or of his representative
(as specially defined in the statute). The minimum civil penalty
is $5000; however, these provisions do not apply if the disclosure
123. The inner envelope should be sealed, with the title and number of the action,
name of the witness, and date of the subpoena written on it. The inner envelope should be
enclosed in another envelope, sealed, and sent to the clerk of court, who will open it "only
at the direction of the judge or tribunal." LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 13:3715.1(B)-(D) (West
Supp. 1990). The copies should be accompanied by an affidavit by the custodian or other
qualified witness stating that the affiant is duly authorized to certify the records, that they
are true copies of all records described in the subpoena, and that the records were prepared
by or under the control of hospital or clinic personnel. If the facility has none or only some
of the described records, the affiant should so state. Id § 13:3715.1(E)-(F). If the
subpoena is not served at least five days before the date that production is required, it
should be quashed by the trial court without an appearance by the facility. Id.
§ 13:3715.2(1). On the other hand, if a copy of the request for the subpoena duces tecum
arrives by hand or registered mail more than five days ahead of time, the subpoena itself is
considered timely. Id. § 13:3715.2(2).
124. Id. § 40:1299.43(I)(l)-(2) (West Supp. 1990).
125. Id. § 40:1299.35.5. The statute appears to have been tailored to comply with
elaborate requirements for such laws, as prescribed by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti I1), 443 U.S. 622 (1979), and Planned Parenthood Ass'n
v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
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is required by law. 126
The AIDS statute mandates that results of AIDS tests be
released only to certain people and agencies, and judicial officers
are not among them. 127 The allowed disclosures are extremely
limited: they may only be made to emergency and other medical
personnel who have been exposed to an AIDS victim or a carrier
of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), and institutions
receiving the infected patient should be told as well. Deaths of
those with HIV must be reported to the coroner (as must all
other "sudden, accidental, violent, or suspicious" deaths). 128 In
all cases in which AIDS is involved, precautions must be taken
to protect the identities of both the person with HIV and the
persons who may have been exposed to it.1 29
There are also special laws governing professional peer
review.1 30 Records and proceedings of "[a]ny hospital commit-
tee... [or] peer review committee of a group medical practice of
twenty or more physicians"1 31 are confidential and may only be
used in the proper fumctions of the committee. The records are
not subject to discovery or subpoena, except that records form-
ing the basis of a decision affecting the hospital staff privileges of
a physician may be obtained by that physician. 132 Any hospital
or organization and its personnel are immune from damages for
releasing information to such a committee. 133 The patient may
still gain access to his records under R.S. 40:2144.134
IV. FEDERAL LAW
A. Generally No Physician-Patient Privilege
In the Fifth Circuit, there is no physician-patient privilege
of any variety.1 35 Admissibility of evidence in federal criminal
126. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:2352(D) (West 1982).
127. Id § 40:1299.42 (West Supp. 1990).
128. Id § 33:1562(A) (West 1988); accord id § 40:1099 (West Supp. 1990).
129. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1099.
130. See id. § 13:3715.3 (West Supp. 1990).
131. Id § 13:3715.3(A)(2). This should include health maintenance organizations,
ambulatory surgical centers, and other health-care providing organizations.
132. Id § 13:3715.3(A).
133. Id § 13:3715.3(B).
134. Id § 13:3715.3(F). See generally Annotation, Right of Voluntary Disclosure of
Privileged Proceedings of Hospital Medical Review or Doctor Evaluation Processes, 60
A.L.R.4th 1273 (1988).
135. See United States v. Burzynski Cancer Research Inst., 819 F.2d 1301, 1311 (5th
Cir. 1987) (criminal proceedings), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1065 (1988); United States v.
Meagher, 531 F.2d 752, 753 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853 (1976); United States v.
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cases is governed by the common law, unless modified by Con-
gress.13 6 Privileged information, in general, is governed by the
common law as interpreted by federal courts "in the light of rea-
son and experience." 137  Since there was no physician-patient
privilege at common law,13 and Congress has not chosen to
adopt one, there is none now.139 However, with respect to civil
claims or defenses decided under state law, Rule 501 provides
that state privilege rules apply. 4°
Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504141 would have
recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege. That privilege
would not apply, however, when a party put his sanity at
issue. 142 In passing the general privilege rule, instead of the spe-
cific psychotherapist-patient privilege, Congress was not to be
"understood as disapproving ... a psychiatrist-patient [privi-
lege] ... ; [r]ather, [its] action should be understood as reflecting
the view that the recognition of a privilege based on a confiden-
tial relationship and other privileges should be determined on a
case-by-case basis."' 143 Notably, the proposed rule was approved
as part of the uniform rules, applying to psychotherapists and
optionally to all physicians 44
Some circuits recognize the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege, while others do not. 145 For instance, the Second and Elev-
enth Circuits do not recognize the privilege. 14 6 Yet the Sixth
Circuit in the case In re Zuniga, held that there is a psychothera-
Mancuso, 444 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1971) (Clark, Justice); United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d
1032 (5th Cir. 1971); Barnes v. United States, 374 F.2d 126 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 917 (1967) and 390 U.S. 972 (1968).
136. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.
137. FED. R. EVID. 501.
138. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2380; see supra note 9 and accompanying text
(on early modes of trial at common law).
139. Meagher, 531 F.2d at 753.
140. FED. R. EvID. 501; see also United States v. Mancuso, 444 F.2d 691, 695 (5th
Cir. 1971) (decided when FED. R. Civ. P. 43 contained the civil rule now in the Rules of
Evidence).
141. 56 F.R.D. 183, 240-41 (1972).
142. Id.
143. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7051, 7059.
144. UNiP. R. EVID. 503.
145. See generally Annotation, Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege Under Federal
Common Law, 72 A.L.R. Fed. 395 (1985).
146. See United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154 (11th Cir. 1983) (applying the
same reasoning as the Fifth Circuit); United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607,
611 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Witt, 542 F. Supp. 696
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 697 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982).
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pist-patient privilege. 147 The court saw a special need to ensure
confidentiality in psychotherapy. Because the Fifth and Elev-
enth Circuits did not consider this special need, the Sixth Circuit
found their cases unpersuasive.1 48 Instead, the court concluded
"that a psychotherapist-patient privilege is mandated by 'reason
and experience.' Rule 501. ' 149 The court also held, however,
that the scope of the privilege did not include "the identity of the
patients, the dates on which they were treated and the length of
the treatment on each date." ' One factor in this decision was
that the patients had already disclosed their identities to insur-
ance companies. This theory of waiver was also used by the Sev-
enth Circuit in applying an Illinois privilege statute.15 1
B. The Constitutional Right to Privacy
Some courts have held that a constitutional right to privacy
protects certain medical relationships. Apparently, no Fifth Cir-
cuit case has considered the broad question whether a privilege
might arise under the constitutional right to privacy; however,
Louisiana courts have addressed the issue. 152 Those federal
courts that do recognize some sort of privilege arising from the
privacy right, limit its applicability by requiring that the state
interest in disclosure be balanced against the individual's interest
in confidentiality.1 53 The balancing usually tilts in favor of dis-
closure. For instance, in Zuniga the Sixth Circuit assumed that
such a right existed, but held that the need for disclosure out-
weighed the interest in privacy when a grand jury sought the
names of psychotherapists' patients and the dates and times they
were treated. In doing so, the court emphasized the secrecy
shrouding grand jury investigations.15 4
The Third Circuit has squarely addressed the question of
147. In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983).
148. Id. at 638.
149. Id at 639.
150. Id at 640; see also MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 100; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 8, § 2384 & n.2.
151. In re Pebsworth, 705 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1983). Also, because there is a privilege
statute in the District of Columbia, decisions there have little applicability in other federal
courts. See Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
152. See Arsenaux v. Arsenaux, 428 So. 2d 427, 430 (La. 1983); Lemann v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 523 So. 2d 948, 951-52 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1988) ("compelling" privacy
right in medical records).
153. Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 641.
154. Id at 641-42.
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privilege and the constitutional right to privacy. 55 Noting" 'the
individual interest in avoiding disclosing personal matters,'"
and observing that medical records were "clearly within this
constitutionally protected sphere," the court in In re Search
Warrant (Sealed) held that this interest must bow to a grand
jury interest in investigating fraud. 5 6 The Search Warrant court
stated that Whalen v. Roe "strongly suggests the existence of
some constitutional right on the part of patients to preserve con-
fidentiality with respect to medical treatment." 157 The court,
however, noted that identities and other information had already
been given to insurance companies. Following the Zuniga court,
the Third Circuit relied on the judicial safeguards of confidenti-
ality, such as grand jury secrecy and sealing. 58
C. Statutes and Regulations
1. Alcohol- and Drug-Abuse Patients1 5 9
There are extraordinarily strict laws and regulations limit-
ing the disclosure of medical records of patients who have
abused drugs or alcohol. Under the Comprehensive Alcohol
Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1970,
Records of the identity, diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment of
any patient which are maintained in connection with the per-
formance of any program or activity relating to alcoholism or
alchohol abuse education, training, treatment, rehabilitation, or
research, which is conducted, regulated, or directly or indi-
rectly assisted by any department or agency of the United
States shall, except as provided in... this section, be confiden-
tial and be disclosed only for the purposes and under the cir-
155. See In re Search Warrant (Sealed), 810 F.2d 67 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S.
1007 (1987).
156. Id at 71 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), which upheld a statute
requiring physicians to report certain patients and prescriptions to a registry).
157. MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 98 & n.13.
158. Search Warrant, 810 F.2d at 72-73.
The case law on the constitutional right of privacy is complicated and controversial,
and at the moment has an uncertain future. The important cases are collected in
MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 98 n.13. The plurality decision in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989), does not bode well for constitutional protections of
privacy, although its threatened attack focuses more on Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
than on Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), or Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). See generally Smith, Constitutional Privacy in Psychotherapy, 49 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1 (1980).
159. The author would like to thank B. Peter Urbanowicz, Esq., for providing access
to research he conducted in this area.
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cumstances expressly authorized under... this section."6
The Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972 contains a
similar provision; records described in the 1970 Act are
restricted under the 1972 statute when they "are maintained in
connection with the performance of any drug abuse prevention
function" aided by the federal government.1 61 The scope of the
statutes are very broad. For example, a health care provider
that receives any Medicare payments is considered federally
assisted.1 62
The language of the statutes does not precisely decribe what
should be considered a "program," or exactly what records are
protected. Courts that have addressed the issue have interpreted
the statutes broadly, and health care providers should proceed
with caution when they receive a request for a record that refers
to drug or alcohol abuse. The case In re Baby X 163 concerned
hospital records of a newborn child and its mother. The records
were not part of any conventional drug treatment program, but
they did show that the baby and mother were addicted to heroin.
The court held that these records would be covered by the fed-
eral confidentiality statutes. 164 Similarly, in Commissioner of
Social Services v. David R.S., the New York Court of Appeals
held that records about drug abuse maintained by a multiservice
social assistance agency were "program" records covered by the
federal statutes, even though the patient first went to the agency
for pregnancy testing.1 65
These records may be released if the patient gives written
authorization.1 66  Consent is revocable, however. Disclosed
information may not be redisclosed, and consent to release to
parole officers and the like must expire when the officers no
longer have a right to know.1 67 The only other justification for
releasing the information in a judicial setting (as opposed to,
e.g., in medical emergencies) is "an appropriate order of a court
160. Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and
Rehabilitation Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-3(a) (1988).
161. Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 290ee-3(a) (1988).
162. 42 C.F.R. § 2.12(b)(2) (1989).
163. 97 Mich. App. 111, 293 N.W.2d 736 (1980).
164. See id at 120, 293 N.W.2d at 741.
165. 55 N.Y.2d 588, 436 N.E.2d 451, 451 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1982).
166. The authorization form should include the name or designation of the party
authorized to make the disclosure, the name or title of the person authorized to receive it,
the name of the patient, the purpose of disclosure, and what information is to be disclosed.
42 C.F.R. § 2.31 (1988) (also giving a sample form).
167. Id § 2.35(c) passim.
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of competent jurisdiction granted after application showing good
cause therefor."' 168 All state laws which would allow or compel
disclosure otherwise are preempted and unenforceable, except
where child abuse is suspected. 169
When presented with a subpoena or court order requesting
disclosure of these records, the provider should not immediately
comply. It should insist on a hearing to show cause, referring
the court to the applicable laws and regulations. 170 The statute
enumerates factors for the court to consider.171 Pursuant to its
rule-making authority, 172 the Department of Health and Human
Services has promulgated extensive regulations governing
aspects of confidentiality and disclosure of these special medical
records.
Under these rules, there must be both a subpoena or other
compulsory process and a court order whose "only purpose is to
authorize a disclosure or use of patient information which would
otherwise be prohibited" under the Act. 17  The usual court
orders requesting all records, charts, and other documents,
should be resisted. 74 Such special orders may only be issued if
"disclosure is necessary to protect against an existing threat to
life or of serious bodily injury, including . . . suspected child
abuse.., and verbal threats against third parties," or when "dis-
closure is necessary in connection with investigation or prosecu-
tion of an extremely serious crime, such as ... homicide," or
when the patient has offered testimony regarding these confiden-
tial communications. 175
Until all of the requirements for disclosure are met, the hos-
pital may not even confirm a patient's presence in a drug or alco-
hol rehabilitation area. The most prudent policy is to give the
inquiring party a copy of 42 C.F.R. part 2 and 42 U.S.C. sec-
tions 290dd-3 and 290ee-3, which provide that disclosure of such
168. Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and
Rehabilitation Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-3(b)(2)(C) (1988); Drug Abuse Office and
Treatment Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 290ee-3(b)(2)(C) (1988). If one wrongfully releases
information under these Acts, he is subject to penalties, ranging from $500 to $5,000. 42
U.S.C. §§ 290dd-3(f), 290ee-3(f).
169. See id. §§ 290dd-3(e), 290ee-3(e); 42 C.F.R. § 2.20; 2A HEALTH LAW CENTER,
HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL T 3-6 (1986) [hereinafter HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL].
170. 2A HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL, supra note 169, 3-6.
171. 42 U.S.C. §§ 290dd-3(b)(2)(C), 290ee-3(b)(2)(c).
172. Id. §§ 290dd-3(g), 290ee-3(g).
173. 42 C.F.R. § 2.61(a) (1988).
174. 2A HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL, supra note 169, 3-6.
175. 42 C.F.R. § 2.63.
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information is protected. The hospital may state that a certain
individual is not and never was a patient, but because of the
problems of negative implication, handing out copies of the reg-
ulations in all cases is the best policy.176
Disclosure of the records of patients treated for drug and
alcohol abuse may be compelled in civil actions only if other
regulatory procedures are followed. 177 The application for sub-
poena must not only use a fictitious name like John Doe, but
must also allow the hospital or other provider an opportunity to
file a written response or appear in person. 178 Any review must
be in chambers, unless the patient requests an open hearing. 179
An order may be issued only upon a finding that there are no
other effective ways to obtain the information, and that the pub-
lic interest "outweigh[s] the potential injury to the patient, the
physician-patient relationship and the treatment services."' 80
The order must limit disclosure to those who need to know.
Also, disclosure is confined to the essential parts of the record,
and other devices to limit disclosure, such as sealing, are
appropriate.181
The same procedures and criteria apply if the hospital or a
law enforcement agency wishes to use records for a criminal
investigation or prosecution. There must also be "a reasonable
likelihood that the records will disclose information of substan-
tial value in the investigation or prosecution."1 82 If the applica-
tion is sought by a law enforcement officer, the hospital must be
"afforded an opportunity to be represented by independent
counsel."'18 3  Unless the requisite court orders have been
obtained according to the above rules, no record "may be used
to initiate or substantiate any criminal charges against a patient
or to conduct any investigation of a patient."'81 4 If the informa-
tion is obtained through any method other than specific court
order, even if that method is lawful, the information may not be
176. See id. § 2.13(c).
177. Id. § 2.64.
178. Id § 2.64(b)(2).
179. Id § 2.64(c).
180. Id § 2.64(d)(2).
181. Id. § 2.64(d)-(e).
182. Id. § 2.65(d)(2).
183. Id § 2.65(a)(5)(i).
184. Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and
Rehabilitation Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-3(c) (1988).
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used.18 5
There are specific procedures for obtaining a court order
when the hospital or its personnel are suspected of criminal
activity. No notice to the hospital is required, although upon
implementation of such an order, the hospital, personnel, or
patient must be given an opportunity to seek revocation or
amendment. Otherwise, the same criteria and limitations as in
section 2.64 apply. Use of undercover agents and informants
may be authorized if the hospital or personnel are suspected of
criminal activity but in no other case. Notice must be given to
the director of the program, unless the director is suspected or
might disclose the confidential information. Before issuing an
order under this section, the court must find that "[t]here is rea-
son to -believe that an employee or agent of the program is
engaged in criminal activity,"' 186 that there are no other ways to
obtain the information, and that the public interest outweighs
the possible harm done. The order must specifically authorize
the placement of an informant or officer, limit the period to six
months, prohibit the officer from disclosing patient-identifying
information, and limit disruption to the program. 18 7 No infor-
mation obtained through the undercover agent may be used
against a patient. 188
The above regulations apply only to information that
"[w]ould identify a patient as an alcohol . . . abuser either
directly, by reference . . . or through verification."' 189 The
restrictions, however, do not apply to information passed
between personnel who need to know as part of the treatment
program, or to the entity that administrates the program. 190
Information may also be disclosed to obtain services for the
program.
If a patient commits a crime on the premises or against pro-
gram personnel, or threatens to do so, a report of the incident,
patient status, the patient's name and address, along with the
patient's last known whereabouts, may be disclosed.' 9' The Act
provides that child abuse reporting laws remain in effect, but the
185. 42 C.F.R. § 2.12(d).
186. Id. § 2.67(c)(1).
187. Id. §§ 2.66-.67.
188. I §§ 2.17, 2.66(d)(2), 2.67(e).
189. Id. § 2.12(a)(1)(i).
190. Id. § 2.12(c)(3).
191. Id. § 2.12(c)(4)-(5).
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confidentiality restrictions do apply when records are sought to
be used in criminal or civil proceedings which arise out of the
report of abuse. 192
Similarly, as required by law, vital statistics may be
reported upon a patient's death. Otherwise, identifying informa-
tion about a deceased patient may not be given without written
consent by the patient or his appointed representative, such as
his executor or administrator.
193
The federal programs that supply heroin addicts with meth-
adone are subject to the above confidentiality regulations, and
the Food and Drug Administration is authorized to copy the
records subject to them.1 94 These programs are also governed by
other federal regulations. Appended to one such methadone
regulation, which subjects those programs to the usual confiden-
tiality provisions, is an unexplained sentence that states, "A
treatment program may reveal such records only when necessary
in a related administrative or court proceeding."' 195 What this
sentence means is not clear; perhaps it intends to summarize the
confidentiality regulations. Any other interpretation would
endanger the elaborate system that carefully protects abusers,
and encourages them to seek treatment without fear of prosecu-
tion or harrassment.
Those who conduct research in the areas of psychoactive
drugs and who use human subjects may apply for a certificate of
confidentiality under procedures outlined in 42 C.F.R. part 2a.
These regulations are independent of those governing patients in
federally assisted alcohol- and drug-abuse programs. Also, if the
Attorney General of the United States conducts research on the
uses of illegal or controlled substances, he may direct that the
subjects' identities remain confidential. In that case, their identi-
ties are absolutely undiscoverable, whether in state, federal, or
international criminal or civil proceedings. Additionally, no
treaties may be construed to require this type of disclosure.196
2. Other Federal Laws
The Privacy Act of 1974 regulates government contractors
when a federal agency contracts for the operation of "a system
192. Id. § 2.12(e)(6).
193. Id. § 2.15(b)(2).
194. Id. § 291.505(g) (1988).
195. Id § 291.505(g)(2).
196. 21 U.S.C. § 872(c)-(d) (1988).
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of records to accomplish an agency function." 197 For the statute
to apply, the records must be kept "on behalf of an agency." 198
From its language, the Act should only apply when an agency is
supposed to keep records as part of its function, and specifically
makes a contract with a private party for the keeping of such
records. The Privacy Act of 1974 probably does not apply to
most private hospitals, although in some instances it could, and
it may apply to some public hospitals. A clear case in which a
hospital would be subject to the Act is when it keeps a cancer
registry pursuant to a federal contract. 199
The Freedom of Information Act of 1966 (FOIA) probably
does not apply to most private hospitals either. °° It applies only
to government agencies and contains no provisions for govern-
ment contractors. In Forsham v. Harris, the Supreme Court
held that those who perform research as federal grantees, even if
the funding agency has the right to obtain the records, are not
subject to the FOIA. °1 Only if the agency actually did obtain
the records would the documents become "agency records" and
subject to the FOIA.2 °2
V. SUMMARY
The state and federal law on disclosure of medical informa-
tion may be summarized, albeit not very briefly. There is a med-
ical privilege limited to physicians, board-certified social workers
and licensed mental health counselors in state criminal matters;
the privilege applies to all knowledge obtained in a professional
capacity. The privilege does not apply when a health care pro-
vider suspects abuse of children or helpless adults; rather, the
physician must report his suspicions. In Louisiana, some con-
troversy remains whether hospital records may be admitted into
evidence in spite of the privilege. There are further exceptions
when a hospital performs drunk-driving blood tests according to
special laws, and when a defendant pleads insanity.
There is a more comprehensive medical privilege in state
civil cases, although it is considered waived in will contests and
tort or worker's compensation claims for personal injuries.
197. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(m) (1988).
198. Id.
199. 2A HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL, supra note 169, 3-7.
200. See 5 U.S.C. § 552.
201. 445 U.S. 169, 171 (1980).
202. Id. See generally 2A HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL, supra note 169, 3-8.
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There is no privilege in child custody proceedings. A court
might find waiver in an action in which a plaintiff's mental or
physical condition is an essential element, but this issue is not
settled. Courts are wary of finding the privilege waived by the
institution of a suit other than one enumerated in the statute.
When the privilege is waived, medical information may be
released. When it is not waived, there are special laws governing
exactly how the medical information should be sent and sealed
for trial.
Absent waiver, no information should be disclosed during
discovery. Disclosing medical information without express per-
mission of the patient is a tort, for which the hospital, clinic,
physician, or other provider would be liable. The privilege is
also waived when a successful malpractice claimant is examined
for future medical care, and there are special laws governing
AIDS, peer review, minors' abortions, and organ donations.
Medical information enjoys much less protection under fed-
eral law. In the Fifth Circuit there is no medical privilege at all.
Although other circuits have recognized certain varieties of a
medical privilege, they are generally confined to the psychother-
apist-patient relationship because of the special need for confi-
dentiality in that setting. Special laws govern the release of
information about patients in alcohol- and drug-abuse programs.
Peer review and the reporting of malpractitioners is also gov-
erned to some extent by federal law. Other federal statutes that
govern the disclosure of information probably do not apply to
most hospitals.
VI. FINAL OBSERVATIONS
Certain areas of the law on disclosure of medical informa-
tion is in need of development and clarification. At present the
most obvious problem in Louisiana law is the hospital records
controversy. 0 3 The problem is all the more frustrating because
in reality there is no controversy: Both the Supreme Court of
Louisiana and the courts of appeal have recognized that the stat-
ute allowing admission of hospital records into evidence is not
meant to abrogate any privileges, but that it is meant to expand
the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The supreme
court should have expressly overruled State v. O'Brien, which
held otherwise. That case was wrong when decided, and it is
203. See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
199
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wrong now. The error is exacerbated because lower courts con-
tinue to follow its unsound reasoning, under the theory that the
supreme court only distinguished it and did not overrule it.
Respect for stare decisis2 obstructed the supreme court's
effort to correct the mistake of O'Brien. The lower courts in
State v. Berluchaux should have held that after State v. Walker
and State v. Carter, in which the supreme court criticized and
distinguished O'Brien, the O'Brien "rationale" was limited to its
specific facts and was no longer good law. By continuing to
apply O'Brien, the courts of appeal failed to recognize the key
device of limiting a case to its specific facts without overruling it.
If the appellate courts had recognized this, their opinions would
have followed the reasoning of the supreme court. At present,
however, the cases decided by the lower courts are inconsistent
with the supreme court opinions, inconsistent with the purpose
of the statute, and inconsistent with most authorities on the
subject.
The issue presented by Arsenaux v. Arsenaux 20 5 is more
problematic than the medical-records question in that it does not
admit one clearly correct answer. In Arsenaux, a wife sued for
alimony and alleged that she was free from fault. The husband
was not allowed to introduce medical records that proved she
was adulterous because a suit for separation and divorce is not
one of the statutorily enumerated actions that waives the privi-
lege. Nor did the supreme court agree that the wife had made
her physical condition an "essential element" of the suit by
alleging freedom from fault. Thus, by upholding the wife's invo-
cation of the medical privilege to exclude probative evidence
against her, the supreme court committed a miscarriage of jus-
tice in Arsenaux. In so doing, however, the court may have rein-
forced the protection that a medical relationship sometimes
needs, and arguably the court was right not to let hard facts lead
to bad law.
The problem raised by Arsenaux is typical of problems
raised by privileges in general: they can lead to grossly incorrect
results because evidence-often the best evidence-is withheld
from the factfinder. For this reason Wigmore and other com-
204. At this point in the legal history of Louisiana, the state courts consistently cite
prior decisions as authority that is almost as binding (if not equally as binding) as in
common-law states.
205. See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
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mentators disparaged privileges,20 6 particularly the physician-
patient privilege. Also, many scholars have doubted that confi-
dentiality is essential to the relationship between a patient and a
health care provider. Yet this author agrees with the Arsenaux
court. When privileges exist, miscarriages of justice will occur.
But the relationship that is protected, on the whole, outweighs
some of the individually incorrect results.
Confidentiality is important in many health care relation-
ships. The existence of so many privilege statutes should make
that principle clear. The extraordinary federal regulations pro-
tecting patients treated for drug abuse are another example.20 7
By ensuring the patients' confidentiality, these regulations
encourage victims of drug abuse to seek medical assistance, help-
ing them to turn from drugs and rejoin the rest of society. Simi-
larly, the victims of the deadly and stigmatizing human
immunodeficiency virus, which causes AIDS, must feel that they
can get medical advice.2 8 Society cannot afford to scare people
away from medical treatment. It is particularly important that
AIDS victims and those in drug rehabilitation programs, who
would suffer the most from disclosure, be encouraged to get
help. All of society benefits when they receive treatment; the
spread of AIDS is impeded, and the spread of the drug culture is
slowed.
These are the reasons that the medical privilege exists.
Courts should be skeptical of alleged implied waivers, especially
when statutes require express waiver. The federal courts should
look more closely when they consider the subject. The drug-
and alcohol-abuse regulations show that, in certain contexts, the
federal government is at least as sympathetic to the privilege as
the states are. The Sixth Circuit approach, finding that the psy-
chotherapy relationship mandated a privilege "in the light of
reason and experience," is in accord with the states' laws, with
the various federal regulations, and with the intent of Congress.
At present, we cannot afford to undercut the medical relation-
206. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 159-98 and accompanying text.
208. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 920, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1972 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEWS 2062, 2072, cited with approval in United States v. Graham,
548 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1977).
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ship, for we just as surely would undermine its power for
healing.
DAVID V. SNYDER*
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